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  1. Guruswami, Venkatesan (Ed.)
    A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a relaxed variant of Nash equilibrium called σ-smooth Nash equilibrium, for a {smoothness parameter} σ. In a σ-smooth Nash equilibrium, players only need to achieve utility at least as high as their best deviation to a σ-smooth strategy, which is a distribution that does not put too much mass (as parametrized by σ) on any fixed action. We distinguish two variants of σ-smooth Nash equilibria: strong σ-smooth Nash equilibria, in which players are required to play σ-smooth strategies under equilibrium play, and weak σ-smooth Nash equilibria, where there is no such requirement. We show that both weak and strong σ-smooth Nash equilibria have superior computational properties to Nash equilibria: when σ as well as an approximation parameter ϵ and the number of players are all constants, there is a {constant-time} randomized algorithm to find a weak ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibrium in normal-form games. In the same parameter regime, there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm to find a strong ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game. These results stand in contrast to the optimal algorithm for computing ϵ-approximate Nash equilibria, which cannot run in faster than quasipolynomial-time, subject to complexity-theoretic assumptions. We complement our upper bounds by showing that when either σ or ϵ is an inverse polynomial, finding a weak ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibria becomes computationally intractable. Our results are the first to propose a variant of Nash equilibrium which is computationally tractable, allows players to act independently, and which, as we discuss, is justified by an extensive line of work on individual choice behavior in the economics literature. 
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  2. Free, publicly-accessible full text available July 1, 2024
  3. Free, publicly-accessible full text available July 1, 2024
  4. We prove fast mixing and characterize the sta- tionary distribution of the Langevin Algorithm for inverting random weighted DNN generators. This result extends the work of Hand and Voroninski from efficient inversion to efficient posterior sampling. In practice, to allow for increased ex- pressivity, we propose to do posterior sampling in the latent space of a pre-trained generative model. To achieve that, we train a score-based model in the latent space of a StyleGAN-2 and we use it to solve inverse problems. Our framework, Score-Guided Intermediate Layer Optimization (SGILO), extends prior work by replacing the sparsity regularization with a generative prior in the intermediate layer. Experimentally, we obtain sig- nificant improvements over the previous state-of- the-art, especially in the low measurement regime. 
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