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This paper is concerned with the mathematical analysis of an inverse random source problem for the time fractional diffusion equation, where the source is driven by a fractional Brownian motion. Given the random source, the direct problem is to study the stochastic time fractional diffusion equation. The inverse problem is to determine the statistical properties of the source from the expectation and variance of the final time data. For the direct problem, we show that it is well-posed and has a unique mild solution under a certain condition. For the inverse problem, the uniqueness is proved and the instability is characterized. The major ingredients of the analysis are based on the properties of the Mittag–Leffler function and the stochastic integrals associated with the fractional Brownian motion. 

Recent years have witnessed the rise of Internet-of-Things (IoT) based cyber attacks. These attacks, as expected, are launched from compromised IoT devices by exploiting security flaws already known. Less clear, however, are the fundamental causes of the pervasiveness of IoT device vulnerabilities and their security implications, particularly in how they affect ongoing cybercrimes. To better understand the problems and seek effective means to suppress the wave of IoT-based attacks, we conduct a comprehensive study based on a large number of real-world attack traces collected from our honeypots, attack tools purchased from the underground, and information collected from high-profile IoT attacks. This study sheds new light on the device vulnerabilities of today’s IoT systems and their security implications: ongoing cyber attacks heavily rely on these known vulnerabilities and the attack code released through their reports; on the other hand, such a reliance on known vulnerabilities can actually be used against adversaries. The same bug reports that enable the development of an attack at an exceedingly low cost can also be leveraged to extract vulnerability-specific features that help stop the attack. In particular, we leverage Natural Language Processing (NLP) to automatically collect and analyze more than 7,500 security reports (with 12,286 security critical IoT flaws in total) scattered across bug-reporting blogs, forums, and mailing lists on the Internet. We show that signatures can be automatically generated through an NLP-based report analysis, and be used by intrusion detection or firewall systems to effectively mitigate the threats from today’s IoT-based attacks. 

Recent years have witnessed the rise of Internet-of-Things (IoT) based cyber attacks. These attacks, as expected, are launched from compromised IoT devices by exploiting security flaws already known. Less clear, however, are the fundamental causes of the pervasiveness of IoT device vulnerabilities and their security implications, particularly in how they affect ongoing cybercrimes. To better understand the problems and seek effective means to suppress the wave of IoT-based attacks, we conduct a comprehensive study based on a large number of real-world attack traces collected from our honeypots, attack tools purchased from the underground, and information collected from high-profile IoT attacks. This study sheds new light on the device vulnerabilities of today's IoT systems and their security implications: ongoing cyber attacks heavily rely on these known vulnerabilities and the attack code released through their reports; on the other hand, such a reliance on known vulnerabilities can actually be used against adversaries. The same bug reports that enable the development of an attack at an exceedingly low cost can also be leveraged to extract vulnerability-specific features that help stop the attack. In particular, we leverage Natural Language Processing (NLP) to automatically collect and analyze more than 7,500 security reports (with 12,286 security critical IoT flaws in total) scattered across bug-reporting blogs, forums, and mailing lists on the Internet. We show that signatures can be automatically generated through an NLP-based report analysis, and be used by intrusion detection or firewall systems to effectively mitigate the threats from today's IoT-based attacks. 

The superτ-charm facility (STCF) is an electron–positron collider proposed by the Chinese particle physics community. It is designed to operate in a center-of-mass energy range from 2 to 7 GeV with a peak luminosity of 0.5 × 10³⁵cm⁻²·s⁻¹or higher. The STCF will produce a data sample about a factor of 100 larger than that of the presentτ-charm factory — the BEPCII, providing a unique platform for exploring the asymmetry of matter-antimatter (charge-parity violation), in-depth studies of the internal structure of hadrons and the nature of non-perturbative strong interactions, as well as searching for exotic hadrons and physics beyond the Standard Model. The STCF project in China is under development with an extensive R&D program. This document presents the physics opportunities at the STCF, describes conceptual designs of the STCF detector system, and discusses future plans for detector R&D and physics case studies.