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Abstract Event boundaries help structure the content of episodic memories by segmenting continuous experiences into discrete events. Event boundaries may also serve to preserve meaningful information within an event, thereby actively separating important memories from interfering representations imposed by past and future events. Here, we tested the hypothesis that event boundaries organize emotional memory based on changing dynamics as events unfold. We developed a novel threat-reversal learning task whereby participants encoded trial-unique exemplars from two semantic categories across three phases: preconditioning, fear acquisition, and reversal. Shock contingencies were established for one category during acquisition (CS+) and then switched to the other during reversal (CS−). Importantly, reversal either was separated by a perceptible event boundary (Experiment 1) or occurred immediately after acquisition, with no perceptible context shift (Experiment 2). In a surprise recognition memory test the next day, memory performance tracked the learning contingencies from encoding in Experiment 1, such that participants selectively recognized more threat-associated CS+ exemplars from before (retroactive) and during acquisition, but this pattern reversed toward CS− exemplars encoded during reversal. By contrast, participants with continuous encoding—without a boundary between conditioning and reversal—exhibited undifferentiated memory for exemplars from both categories encoded before acquisition and after reversal. Further analyses highlight nuanced effects of event boundaries on reversing conditioned fear, updating mnemonic generalization, and emotional biasing of temporal source memory. These findings suggest that event boundaries provide anchor points to organize memory for distinctly meaningful information, thereby adaptively structuring memory based on the content of our experiences. 

Abstract Curiosity can be a powerful motivator to learn and retain new information. Evidence shows that high states of curiosity elicited by a specific source (i.e., a trivia question) can promote memory for incidental stimuli (non-target) presented close in time. The spreading effect of curiosity states on memory for other information has potential for educational applications. Specifically, it could provide techniques to improve learning for information that did not spark a sense of curiosity on its own. Here, we investigated how high states of curiosity induced through trivia questions affect memory performance for unrelated scholastic facts (e.g., scientific, English, or historical facts) presented in close temporal proximity to the trivia question. Across three task versions, participants viewed trivia questions closely followed in time by a scholastic fact unrelated to the trivia question, either just prior to or immediately following the answer to the trivia question. Participants then completed a surprise multiple-choice memory test (akin to a pop quiz) for the scholastic material. In all three task versions, memory performance was poorer for scholastic facts presented after trivia questions that had elicited high versus low levels of curiosity. These results contradict previous findings showing curiosity-enhanced memory for incidentally presented visual stimuli and suggest that target information that generates a high-curiosity state interferes with encoding complex and unrelated scholastic facts presented close in time. 

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients receiving dopaminergic treatment may experience bursts of creativity. Although this phenomenon is sometimes recognized among patients and their clinicians, the association between dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) in PD patients and creativity remains underexplored. It is unclear, for instance, whether DRT affects creativity through convergent or divergent thinking, idea generation, or a general lack of inhibition. It is also unclear whether DRT only augments pre-existing creative attributes or generates creativity de novo . Here, we tested a group of PD patients when “on” and “off” dopaminergic treatment on a series of tests of creative problem-solving (Alternative Uses Task, Compound Remote Associates, Rebus Puzzles), and related their performance to a group of matched healthy controls as well as to their pre-PD creative skills and measures of inhibition/impulsivity. Results did not provide strong evidence that DRT improved creative thinking in PD patients. Rather, PD patients “on” medication showed less flexibility in divergent thinking, generated fewer ideas via insight, and showed worse performance in convergent thinking overall (by making more errors) than healthy controls. Pre-PD creative skills predicted enhanced flexibility and fluency in divergent thinking when PD patients were “on” medication. However, results on convergent thinking were mixed. Finally, PD patients who exhibited deficits in a measure of inhibitory control showed weaker convergent thinking while “on” medication, supporting previous evidence on the importance of inhibitory control in creative problem-solving. Altogether, results do not support the hypothesis that DRT promotes creative thinking in PD. We speculate that bursts of artistic production in PD are perhaps conflated with creativity due to lay conceptions of creativity (i.e., an art-bias). 

In times of uncertainty, people often seek out information to help alleviate fear, possibly leaving them vulnerable to false information. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we attended to a viral spread of incorrect and misleading information that compromised collective actions and public health measures to contain the spread of the disease. We investigated the influence of fear of COVID-19 on social and cognitive factors including believing in fake news, bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, and problem-solving—within two of the populations that have been severely hit by COVID-19: Italy and the United States of America. To gain a better understanding of the role of misinformation during the early height of the COVID-19 pandemic, we also investigated whether problem-solving ability and socio-cognitive polarization were associated with believing in fake news. Results showed that fear of COVID-19 is related to seeking out information about the virus and avoiding infection in the Italian and American samples, as well as a willingness to share real news (COVID and non-COVID-related) headlines in the American sample. However, fear positively correlated with bullshit receptivity, suggesting that the pandemic might have contributed to creating a situation where people were pushed toward pseudo-profound existential beliefs. Furthermore, problem-solving ability was associated with correctly discerning real or fake news, whereas socio-cognitive polarization was the strongest predictor of believing in fake news in both samples. From these results, we concluded that a construct reflecting cognitive rigidity, neglecting alternative information, and black-and-white thinking negatively predicts the ability to discern fake from real news. Such a construct extends also to reasoning processes based on thinking outside the box and considering alternative information such as problem-solving.