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Autonomous vehicles (AV) hold great potential to increase road safety, reduce traffic congestion, and improve mobility systems. However, the deployment of AVs introduces new liability challenges when they are involved in car accidents. A new legal framework should be developed to tackle such a challenge. This paper proposes a legal framework, incorporating liability rules to rear-end crashes in mixed-traffic platoons with AVs and human-propelled vehicles (HV). We leverage a matrix game approach to understand interactions among players whose utility captures crash loss for drivers according to liability rules. We investigate how liability rules may impact the game equilibrium between vehicles and whether human drivers’ moral hazards arise if liability is not designed properly. We find that compared to the no-fault liability rule, contributory and comparative rules make road users have incentives to execute a smaller reaction time to improve road safety. There exists moral hazards for human drivers when risk-averse AV players are in the car platoon.