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Social media provide a fertile ground where conspiracy theories and radical ideas can flourish, reach broad audiences, and sometimes lead to hate or violence beyond the online world itself. QAnon represents a notable example of a political conspiracy that started out on social media but turned mainstream, in part due to public endorsement by influential political figures. Nowadays, QAnon conspiracies often appear in the news, are part of political rhetoric, and are espoused by significant swaths of people in the United States. It is therefore crucial to understand how such a conspiracy took root online, and what led so many social media users to adopt its ideas. In this work, we propose a framework that exploits both social interaction and content signals to uncover evidence of user radicalization or support for QAnon. Leveraging a large dataset of 240M tweets collected in the run-up to the 2020 US Presidential election, we define and validate a multivariate metric of radicalization. We use that to separate users in distinct, naturally-emerging, classes of behaviors associated with radicalization processes, from self-declared QAnon supporters to hyper-active conspiracy promoters. We also analyze the impact of Twitter's moderation policies on the interactions among different classes: we discover aspects of moderation that succeed, yielding a substantial reduction in the endorsement received by hyperactive QAnon accounts. But we also uncover where moderation fails, showing how QAnon content amplifiers are not deterred or affected by the Twitter intervention. Our findings refine our understanding of online radicalization processes, reveal effective and ineffective aspects of moderation, and call for the need to further investigate the role social media play in the spread of conspiracies.more » « less
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On October 27th, 2022, Elon Musk purchased Twitter, becoming its new CEO and firing many top executives in the process. Musk listed fewer restrictions on content moderation and removal of spam bots among his goals for the platform. Given findings of prior research on moderation and hate speech in online communities, the promise of less strict content moderation poses the concern that hate will rise on Twitter. We examine the levels of hate speech and prevalence of bots before and after Musk's acquisition of the platform. We find that hate speech rose dramatically upon Musk purchasing Twitter and the prevalence of most types of bots increased, while the prevalence of astroturf bots decreased.more » « less
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The Domain Name System (DNS) is an essential service for the Internet which maps host names to IP addresses. The DNS Root Sever System operates the top of this namespace. RIPE Atlas observes DNS from more than 11k vantage points (VPs) around the world, reporting the reliability of the DNS Root Server System in DNSmon. DNSmon shows that loss rates for queries to the DNS Root are nearly 10\% for IPv6, much higher than the approximately 2\% loss seen for IPv4. Although IPv6 is ``new,'' as an operational protocol available to a third of Internet users, it ought to be just as reliable as IPv4. We examine this difference at a finer granularity by investigating loss at individual VPs. We confirm that specific VPs are the source of this difference and identify two root causes: VP \emph{islands} with routing problems at the edge which leave them unable to access IPv6 outside their LAN, and VP \emph{peninsulas} which indicate routing problems in the core of the network. These problems account for most of the loss and nearly all of the difference between IPv4 and IPv6 query loss rates. Islands account for most of the loss (half of IPv4 failures and 5/6ths of IPv6 failures), and we suggest these measurement devices should be filtered out to get a more accurate picture of loss rates. Peninsulas account for the main differences between root identifiers, suggesting routing disagreements root operators need to address. We believe that filtering out both of these known problems provides a better measure of underlying network anomalies and loss and will result in more actionable alerts.more » « less
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