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Title: Coordinate to cooperate or compete: Abstract goals and joint intentions in social interaction
Successfully navigating the social world requires reasoning about both high-level strategic goals, such as whether to cooperate or compete, as well as the low-level actions needed to achieve those goals. While previous work in experimental game theory has examined the former and work on multi-agent systems has examined the later, there has been little work investigating behavior in environments that require simultaneous planning and inference across both levels. We develop a hierarchical model of social agency that infers the intentions of other agents, strategically decides whether to cooperate or compete with them, and then executes either a cooperative or competitive planning program. Learning occurs across both high-level strategic decisions and low-level actions leading to the emergence of social norms. We test predictions of this model in multi-agent behavioral experiments using rich video-game like environments. By grounding strategic behavior in a formal model of planning, we develop abstract notions of both cooperation and competition and shed light on the computational nature of joint intentionality.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1643413
PAR ID:
10026426
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
COGSCI
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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