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When observing others’ behavior, people use Theory of Mind to infer unobservable beliefs, desires, and intentions. And when showing what activity one is doing, people will modify their behavior in order to facilitate more accurate interpretation and learning by an observer. Here, we present a novel model of how demonstrators act and observers interpret demonstrations corresponding to different levels of recursive social reasoning (i.e. a cognitive hierarchy) grounded in Theory of Mind. Our model can explain how demonstrators show others how to perform a task and makes predictions about how sophisticated observers can reason about communicative intentions. Additionally, we report an experiment that tests (1) how well an observer can learn from demonstrations that were produced with the intent to communicate, and (2) how an observer’s interpretation of demonstrations influences their judgments. 

This paper investigates the problem of interactively learning behaviors communicated by a human teacher using positive and negative feedback. Much previous work on this problem has made the assumption that people provide feedback for decisions that is dependent on the behavior they are teaching and is independent from the learner’s current policy. We present empirical results that show this assumption to be false—whether human trainers give a positive or negative feedback for a decision is influenced by the learner’s current policy. Based on this insight, we introduce Convergent Actor-Critic by Humans (COACH), an algorithm for learning from policy-dependent feedback that converges to a local optimum. Finally, we demonstrate that COACH can successfully learn multiple behaviors on a physical robot. 

We propose a new task-specification language for Markov decision processes that is designed to be an improvement over reward functions by being environment independent. The language is a variant of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) that is extended to probabilistic specifications in a way that permits approximations to be learned in finite time. We provide several small environments that demonstrate the advantages of our geometric LTL (GLTL) language and illustrate how it can be used to specify standard reinforcement-learning tasks straightforwardly. 

Existing machine-learning work has shown that algorithms can benet from curricula---learning first on simple examples before moving to more difficult examples. While most existing work on curriculum learning focuses on developing automatic methods to iteratively select training examples with increasing difficulty tailored to the current ability of the learner, relatively little attention has been paid to the ways in which humans design curricula. We argue that a better understanding of the human-designed curricula could give us insights into the development of new machine-learning algorithms and interfaces that can better accommodate machine- or human-created curricula. Our work addresses this emerging and vital area empirically, taking an important step to characterize the nature of human-designed curricula relative to the space of possible curricula and the performance benefits that may (or may not) occur. 

When teaching, people often intentionally intervene on a learner while it is acting. For instance, a dog owner might move the dog so it eats out of the right bowl, or a coach might intervene while a tennis player is practicing to teach a skill. How do people teach by intervention? And how do these strategies interact with learning mechanisms? Here, we examine one global and two local strategies: working backwards from the end-goal of a task (backwards chaining), placing a learner in a previous state when an incorrect action was taken (undoing), or placing a learner in the state they would be in if they had taken the correct action (correcting). Depending on how the learner interprets an intervention, different teaching strategies result in better learning. We also examine how people teach by intervention in an interactive experiment and find a bias for using local strategies like undoing. 

Successfully navigating the social world requires reasoning about both high-level strategic goals, such as whether to cooperate or compete, as well as the low-level actions needed to achieve those goals. While previous work in experimental game theory has examined the former and work on multi-agent systems has examined the later, there has been little work investigating behavior in environments that require simultaneous planning and inference across both levels. We develop a hierarchical model of social agency that infers the intentions of other agents, strategically decides whether to cooperate or compete with them, and then executes either a cooperative or competitive planning program. Learning occurs across both high-level strategic decisions and low-level actions leading to the emergence of social norms. We test predictions of this model in multi-agent behavioral experiments using rich video-game like environments. By grounding strategic behavior in a formal model of planning, we develop abstract notions of both cooperation and competition and shed light on the computational nature of joint intentionality.