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Title: Sensitivity analysis of convergence bids in nodal electricity markets
Recent reports from Independent System Operators (ISOs) have raised some concerns about the impact of convergence bids (CBs) on nodal electricity markets. In particular, in some cases, there are concerns about cases where CBs are profitable for some market participants without increasing market efficiency significantly or even decreasing market efficiency. The latter occurs when CBs create price divergence instead of price convergence across the day-ahead and real-time markets. Accordingly, in this paper, we investigate the sensitivity of nodal electricity market price to CBs and seek to build an analytical foundation to explain under what conditions placing a CB at a bus in a nodal electricity market can create price divergence at that bus. Illustrative test cases are discussed to provide intuitions and engineering implications of the results on sensitivity analysis.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1711944
NSF-PAR ID:
10073085
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
IEEE PES North American Power System Symposium
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 6
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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