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Electricity bill constitutes a significant portion of operational costs for large scale data centers. Empowering data centers with on-site storages can reduce the electricity bill by shaping the energy procurement from deregulated electricity markets with real-time price fluctuations. This work focuses on designing energy procurement and storage management strategies to minimize the electricity bill of storage-assisted data centers. Designing such strategies is challenging since the net energy demand of the data center and electricity market prices are not known in advance, and the underlying problem is coupled over time due to evolution of the storage level. Using competitive ratio as the performance measure, we propose an online algorithm that determines the energy procurement and storage management strategies using a threshold based policy. Our algorithm achieves the optimal competitive ratio of as a function of the price fluctuation ratio. We validate the algorithm using data traces from electricity markets and data-center energy demands. The results show that our algorithm achieves close to the offline optimal performance and outperforms existing alternatives.%
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Coordinating Distribution System Resources for Co-optimized Participation in Energy and Ancillary Service Transmission System Markets
his work investigates the potential of using aggregate controllable loads and energy storage systems from multiple heterogeneous feeders to jointly optimize a utility's energy procurement cost from the real-time market and their revenue from ancillary service markets. Toward this, we formulate an optimization problem that co-optimizes real-time and energy reserve markets based on real-time and ancillary service market prices, along with available solar power, storage and demand data from each of the feeders within a single distribution network. The optimization, which includes all network system constraints, provides real/reactive power and energy storage set-points for each feeder as well as a schedule for the aggregate system's participation in the two types of markets. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm using several trace-driven simulations based on a real-world circuit of a New Jersey utility. The results demonstrate that active participation through controllable loads and storage significantly reduces the utility's net costs, i.e., real-time energy procurement costs minus ancillary market revenues.
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- PAR ID:
- 10106062
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- American Control Conference
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1315 to 1322
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.23919/ACC.2019.8815242
