When supply disruptions occur, firms want to employ an effective pricing strategy to reduce losses. However, firms typically do not know precisely how customers will react to price changes in the short term, during a disruption. In this article, we investigate the customer's order variability and the firm's profit under several representative heuristic pricing strategies, including no change at all (fixed pricing strategy), changing the price only (naive pricing strategy), and adjusting the belief and price simultaneously (one‐period correction [1PC] and regression pricing strategies). We show that the fixed pricing strategy creates the most stable customer order process, but it brings lower profit than the naive pricing strategy in most cases. The 1PC pricing strategy produces a more volatile customer order process and smaller profit than the naive one does. Although the regression pricing strategy is a more advanced approach, it leads to lower profit and greater customer order variability than the naive pricing strategy (but the opposite when compared to the 1PC strategy). We conclude that (i) completely eliminating the customer order variability by employing a fixed pricing strategy is not advisable and adjusting the price to match supply with demand is necessary to improve the profit; (ii) frequently adjusting the belief about customer behaviors under imperfect information may increase the customer's order variability and reduce the firm's profit. The conclusions are robust to the inventory assumption (i.e., without or with inventory carryover) and the firm's objective (i.e., market clearance or profit maximization).
A Mechanism Design Approach to Vendor Managed Inventory
This paper studies an inventory management problem faced by an upstream supplier that is in a collaborative agreement, such as vendor-managed inventory (VMI), with a retailer. A VMI partnership provides the supplier an opportunity to manage in- ventory for the supply chain in exchange for point-of-sales (POS)- and inventory-level information from the retailer. However, retailers typically possess superior local market information and as has been the case in recent years, are able to capture and analyze customer purchasing behavior beyond the traditional POS data. Such analyses provide the retailer access to market signals that are otherwise hard to capture using POS information. We show and quantify the implication of the financial obligations of each party in VMI that renders communication of such important market signals as noncredible. To help insti- tute a sound VMI collaboration, we propose learn and screen—a dynamic inventory mechanism—for the supplier to effectively manage inventory and information in the supply chain. The proposed mechanism combines the ability of the supplier to learn about market conditions from POS data (over multiple selling periods) and dynamically de- termine when to screen the retailer and acquire his private demand information. Inventory decisions in the proposed mechanism serve a strategic purpose in addition to their classic role of satisfying customer demand. We show that our proposed dynamic mechanism significantly improves the supplier’s expected profit and increases the efficiency of the overall supply chain operations under a VMI agreement. In addition, we determine the market conditions in which a strategic approach to VMI results in significant profit im- provements for both firms, particularly when the retailer has high market power (i.e., when the supplier highly depends on the retailer) and when the supplier has relatively less knowledge about the end customer/market compared with the retailer.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1644935
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10128751
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Management Science
- ISSN:
- 0025-1909
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1-25
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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ABSTRACT -
This paper develops competitive bidding strategies for an online linear optimization problem with inventory management constraints in both cost minimization and profit maximization settings. In the minimization problem, a decision maker should satisfy its time-varying demand by either purchasing units of an asset from the market or producing them from a local inventory with limited capacity. In the maximization problem, a decision maker has a time-varying supply of an asset that may be sold to the market or stored in the inventory to be sold later. In both settings, the market price is unknown in each timeslot and the decision maker can submit a finite number of bids to buy/sell the asset. Once all bids have been submitted, the market price clears and the amount bought/sold is determined based on the clearing price and submitted bids. From this setup, the decision maker must minimize/maximize their cost/profit in the market, while also devising a bidding strategy in the face of an unknown clearing price. We propose DEMBID and SUPBID, two competitive bidding strategies for these online linear optimization problems with inventory management constraints for the minimization and maximization setting respectively. We then analyze the competitive ratios of the proposed algorithms and show that the performance of our algorithms approaches the best possible competitive ratio as the maximum number of bids increases. As a case study, we use energy data traces from Akamai data centers, renewable outputs from NREL, and energy prices from NYISO to show the effectiveness of our bidding strategies in the context of energy storage management for a large energy customer participating in a real-time electricity market.more » « less
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null (Ed.)The prevalence of e-commerce has made customers’ detailed personal information readily accessible to retailers, and this information has been widely used in pricing decisions. When using personalized information, the question of how to protect the privacy of such information becomes a critical issue in practice. In this paper, we consider a dynamic pricing problem over T time periods with an unknown demand function of posted price and personalized information. At each time t, the retailer observes an arriving customer’s personal information and offers a price. The customer then makes the purchase decision, which will be utilized by the retailer to learn the underlying demand function. There is potentially a serious privacy concern during this process: a third-party agent might infer the personalized information and purchase decisions from price changes in the pricing system. Using the fundamental framework of differential privacy from computer science, we develop a privacy-preserving dynamic pricing policy, which tries to maximize the retailer revenue while avoiding information leakage of individual customer’s information and purchasing decisions. To this end, we first introduce a notion of anticipating [Formula: see text]-differential privacy that is tailored to the dynamic pricing problem. Our policy achieves both the privacy guarantee and the performance guarantee in terms of regret. Roughly speaking, for d-dimensional personalized information, our algorithm achieves the expected regret at the order of [Formula: see text] when the customers’ information is adversarially chosen. For stochastic personalized information, the regret bound can be further improved to [Formula: see text]. This paper was accepted by J. George Shanthikumar, big data analytics.more » « less
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In mechanism design, the firm has an advantage over its customers in its knowledge of the state of the system, which can affect the utilities of all players. This poses the question: how can the firm utilize that information (and not additional financial incentives) to persuade customers to take actions that lead to higher revenue (or other firm utility)? When the firm is constrained to "cheap talk," and cannot credibly commit to a manner of signaling, the firm cannot change customer behavior in a meaningful way. Instead, we allow firm to commit to how they will signal in advance. Customers can then trust the signals they receive and act on their realization. This thesis contains the work of three papers, each of which applies information design to service systems and online markets. We begin by examining how a firm could signal a queue's length to arriving, impatient customers in a service system. We show that the choice of an optimal signaling mechanism can be written as a infinite linear program and then show an intuitive form for its optimal solution. We show that with the optimal fixed price and optimal signaling, a firm can generate the same revenue as it could with an observable queue and length-dependent variable prices. Next, we study demand and inventory signaling in online markets: customers make strategic purchasing decisions, knowing the price will decrease if an item does not sell out. The firm aims to convince customers to buy now at a higher price. We show that the optimal signaling mechanism is public, and sends all customers the same information. Finally, we consider customers whose ex ante utility is not simply their expected ex post utility, but instead a function of its distribution. We bound the number of signals needed for the firm to generate their optimal utility and provide a convex program reduction of the firm's problem.more » « less
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Sustainability and long‐term prosperity are chronic challenges in the agriculture sector of many countries. To address such challenges, farmer cooperatives are formed as an innovative approach to improve the livelihoods of millions of farmers around the world. Inspired by real‐life practice in the Kenya coffee industry, we study a class of stochastic and dynamic inventory models for storable agricultural products with random exogenous supply and price. For a variety of cost functions relevant in practice, we characterize the optimal selling policies to maximize the farmer cooperatives’ expected profit. We show that for concave inventory holding cost, the
sell‐all‐or‐retain‐all (r ,R ) (orsell‐all‐or‐retain‐all R ) policies are optimal with (without) the fixed selling cost; for convex holding cost, thesell‐down‐to (S ,s ) (orsell‐down‐to s ) policies are optimal with (without) the fixed selling cost. For the special case of linear holding cost, the optimal policy is acut‐off price policy and we derive closed‐form expressions for the optimal policy and the optimal total discounted profit. We discuss the model extensions to include general stochastic harvest and price processes, selling/storage capacity limits, price‐dependent random demand with a spot market, and the flexibility of procurement from other producers, and then perform a numerical study to quantify the impact of the optimal solutions. Reconciling the theory with practice, useful insights and guidelines are provided to help farmer cooperatives make strategic selling decisions.
- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3297
