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A New Approach to Contract Design with Private Inventory Information In a typical decentralized supply chain, a downstream retailer privately observes its inventory level and has an informational advantage over the upstream supplier. In “A Stationary Infinite-Horizon Supply Contract Under Asymmetric Inventory Information” by Bensoussan, Sethi, and Wang, the authors study how to optimally design a stationary, truth-telling, long-term contract in such a setting. In contrast to the classic first order approach in literature, they formulate the contract design as an optimization over a functional space and develop a solution approach based on the calculus of variations. They further apply their necessary optimality condition to the class of batch-order contracts, which replenish a prespecified inventory quantity for a fixed payment in each period only when the retailer has zero inventory on hand.
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A Mechanism Design Approach to Vendor Managed Inventory
This paper studies an inventory management problem faced by an upstream supplier that is in a collaborative agreement, such as vendor-managed inventory (VMI), with a retailer. A VMI partnership provides the supplier an opportunity to manage in- ventory for the supply chain in exchange for point-of-sales (POS)- and inventory-level information from the retailer. However, retailers typically possess superior local market information and as has been the case in recent years, are able to capture and analyze customer purchasing behavior beyond the traditional POS data. Such analyses provide the retailer access to market signals that are otherwise hard to capture using POS information. We show and quantify the implication of the financial obligations of each party in VMI that renders communication of such important market signals as noncredible. To help insti- tute a sound VMI collaboration, we propose learn and screen—a dynamic inventory mechanism—for the supplier to effectively manage inventory and information in the supply chain. The proposed mechanism combines the ability of the supplier to learn about market conditions from POS data (over multiple selling periods) and dynamically de- termine when to screen the retailer and acquire his private demand information. Inventory decisions in the proposed mechanism serve a strategic purpose in addition to their classic role of satisfying customer demand. We show that our proposed dynamic mechanism significantly improves the supplier’s expected profit and increases the efficiency of the overall supply chain operations under a VMI agreement. In addition, we determine the market conditions in which a strategic approach to VMI results in significant profit im- provements for both firms, particularly when the retailer has high market power (i.e., when the supplier highly depends on the retailer) and when the supplier has relatively less knowledge about the end customer/market compared with the retailer.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1644935
- PAR ID:
- 10128751
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Management Science
- ISSN:
- 0025-1909
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1-25
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3297
