skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.


Title: The Economics of Bundling Content with Unlicensed Wireless Service
Adding new unlicensed wireless spectrum is a promising approach to accommodate increasing traffic demand. However, unlicensed spectrum may have a high risk of becoming congested, and service providers (SPs) may have difficulty to differentiate their wireless services when offering them on the same unlicensed spectrum. When SPs offer identical services, the resulting competition can lead to zero profits. In this work, we consider the case where an SP bundles its wireless service with a content service. We show that this can differentiate the SPs’ services and lead to positive SP profits. In particular, we study the characteristics of the content services that an SP should bundle with its wireless service, and analyze the impact of bundling on consumer surplus.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1701921 1547328 1343381
PAR ID:
10179968
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume:
277
ISSN:
1867-822X
Page Range / eLocation ID:
93-108
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. Unlicensed spectrum has been viewed as a way to increase competition in wireless access and promote innovation in new technologies and business models. However, several recent papers have shown that the openness of such spectrum can also lead to it becoming over congested when used by competing wireless service providers (SPs). This in turn can result in the SPs making no profit and may deter them from entering the market. However, this prior work assumes that unlicensed access is a separate service from any service offered using licensed spectrum. Here, we instead consider the more common case were service providers bundle both licensed and unlicensed spectrum as a single service and offer this with a single price. We analyze a model for such a market and show that in this case SPs are able to gain higher profit than the case without bundling. It is also possible to get higher social welfare with bundling. Moreover, we explore the case where SPs are allowed to manage the customers' average percentage of time they receive service on unlicensed spectrum and characterize the social welfare gap between the profit maximizing and social welfare maximizing setting. 
    more » « less
  2. LTE-U is an extension of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard for operation in unlicensed spectrum. LTE-U differs from WiFi, the predominant technology used in unlicensed spectrum in that it utilizes a duty cycle mode for accessing the spectrum and allows for a more seamless integration with LTE deployments in licensed spectrum. There have been a number of technical studies on the co-existence of LTE-U and WiFi in unlicensed spectrum In this paper, we instead investigate the impact of such a technology from an economic perspective. We consider a model in which an incumbent service provider (SP) deploys a duty cycle-based technology like LTE-U in an unlicensed band along with operating in a licensed band and competes with one or more entrants that only operate in the unlicensed band using a different technology like WiFi. We characterize the impact of a technology like LTE-U on the market outcome and show that the welfare impacts of this technology are subtle, depending in part on the amount of unlicensed spectrum and number of entrants. We also investigate the impact of the duty cycle and the portion of unlicensed spectrum used by the technology. 
    more » « less
  3. With the increasing demand for wireless connectivity, ensuring the efficient coexistence of multiple radio access technologies in shared unlicensed spectrum has become an important issue. This paper focuses on optimizing Medium Access Control (MAC) parameters to enhance the coexistence of 5G New Radio in Unlicensed Spectrum (NR-U) and Wi-Fi networks operating in unlicensed spectrum with multiple priority classes of traffic that may have varying quality-of-service (QoS) requirements. In this context, we tackle the coexistence parameter management problem by introducing a QoS-aware State-Augmented Learnable (QaSAL) framework, designed to improve network performance under various traffic conditions. Our approach augments the state representation with constraint information, enabling dynamic policy adjustments to enforce QoS requirements effectively. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of QaSAL in managing NR-U and Wi-Fi coexistence, demonstrating improved channel access fairness while satisfying a latency constraint for high-priority traffic. 
    more » « less
  4. By not requiring expensive licenses, unlicensed spectrum lowers the barriers for firms to offer wireless services. However, incumbent firms may still try to erect other entry barriers. For example, recent work has highlighted how customer contracts may be used as one such barrier by penalizing customers for switching to a new entrant. However, this work did not account for another potential benefit of unlicensed spectrum, having access to this open resource may incentivize entrants to invest in new and potentially better technology. This paper studies the interaction of contracts and the incentives of firms to invest in developing new technology. We use a game theoretic model to study this and characterize the effect of contracts on economic welfare. The role of subsidies or taxes by a social planner is also considered. 
    more » « less
  5. We analyze the prioritized sharing between an added value Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) and multiple Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). An added value MVNO is one which earns added revenue from wireless users in addition to the revenue it directly collects for providing them wireless service. To offer service, an MVNO needs to contract with one or more MNOs to utilize their networks. Agreeing on such a contract requires the MNOs to consider the impact on their revenue from allowing the MVNO to enter the market as well as the possibility that other MNOs will cooperate. To further protect their customers, the MNOs may prioritize their direct customers over those of the MVNO. We establish a multi-stage game to analyze the equilibrium decisions of the MVNO, MNOs, and users in such a setting. In particular, we characterize the condition under which the MVNO can collaborate with the MNOs. The results show that the MVNO tends to cooperate with the MNOs when the band resources are limited and the added value is significant. When there is significant difference in band resources among the MNOs, the MVNO first considers cooperating with the MNO with a smaller band. We also consider the case when the users also have access to unlicensed spectrum. 
    more » « less