- PAR ID:
- 10297472
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP)
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Multi-sensor fusion has been widely used by autonomous vehicles (AVs) to integrate the perception results from different sensing modalities including LiDAR, camera and radar. Despite the rapid development of multi-sensor fusion systems in autonomous driving, their vulnerability to malicious attacks have not been well studied. Although some prior works have studied the attacks against the perception systems of AVs, they only consider a single sensing modality or a camera-LiDAR fusion system, which can not attack the sensor fusion system based on LiDAR, camera, and radar. To fill this research gap, in this paper, we present the first study on the vulnerability of multi-sensor fusion systems that employ LiDAR, camera, and radar. Specifically, we propose a novel attack method that can simultaneously attack all three types of sensing modalities using a single type of adversarial object. The adversarial object can be easily fabricated at low cost, and the proposed attack can be easily performed with high stealthiness and flexibility in practice. Extensive experiments based on a real-world AV testbed show that the proposed attack can continuously hide a target vehicle from the perception system of a victim AV using only two small adversarial objects.more » « less
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null (Ed.)In Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, perception is both security and safety critical. Despite various prior studies on its security issues, all of them only consider attacks on cameraor LiDAR-based AD perception alone. However, production AD systems today predominantly adopt a Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) based design, which in principle can be more robust against these attacks under the assumption that not all fusion sources are (or can be) attacked at the same time. In this paper, we present the first study of security issues of MSF-based perception in AD systems. We directly challenge the basic MSF design assumption above by exploring the possibility of attacking all fusion sources simultaneously. This allows us for the first time to understand how much security guarantee MSF can fundamentally provide as a general defense strategy for AD perception. We formulate the attack as an optimization problem to generate a physically-realizable, adversarial 3D-printed object that misleads an AD system to fail in detecting it and thus crash into it. To systematically generate such a physical-world attack, we propose a novel attack pipeline that addresses two main design challenges: (1) non-differentiable target camera and LiDAR sensing systems, and (2) non-differentiable cell-level aggregated features popularly used in LiDAR-based AD perception. We evaluate our attack on MSF algorithms included in representative open-source industry-grade AD systems in real-world driving scenarios. Our results show that the attack achieves over 90% success rate across different object types and MSF algorithms. Our attack is also found stealthy, robust to victim positions, transferable across MSF algorithms, and physical-world realizable after being 3D-printed and captured by LiDAR and camera devices. To concretely assess the end-to-end safety impact, we further perform simulation evaluation and show that it can cause a 100% vehicle collision rate for an industry-grade AD system. We also evaluate and discuss defense strategies.more » « less
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