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This paper studies a dynamic pricing problem under model misspecification. To characterize model misspecification, we adopt the ε-contamination model—the most fundamental model in robust statistics and machine learning. In particular, for a selling horizon of length T, the online ε-contamination model assumes that demands are realized according to a typical unknown demand function only for [Formula: see text] periods. For the rest of [Formula: see text] periods, an outlier purchase can happen with arbitrary demand functions. The challenges brought by the presence of outlier customers are mainly due to the fact that arrivals of outliers and their exhibited demand behaviors are completely arbitrary, therefore calling for robust estimation and exploration strategies that can handle any outlier arrival and demand patterns. We first consider unconstrained dynamic pricing without any inventory constraint. In this case, we adopt the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader algorithm to hedge against outlier purchase behavior. Then, we introduce inventory constraints. When the inventory is insufficient, we study a robust bisection-search algorithm to identify the clearance price—that is, the price at which the initial inventory is expected to clear at the end of T periods. Finally, we study the general dynamic pricing case, where a retailer has no clue whether the inventory is sufficient or not. In this case, we design a meta-algorithm that combines the previous two policies. All algorithms are fully adaptive, without requiring prior knowledge of the outlier proportion parameter ε. Simulation study shows that our policy outperforms existing policies in the literature.
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Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Fixed Ordering Cost and Incomplete Demand Information
We consider the periodic review dynamic pricing and inventory control problem with fixed ordering cost. Demand is random and price dependent, and unsatisfied demand is backlogged. With complete demand information, the celebrated [Formula: see text] policy is proved to be optimal, where s and S are the reorder point and order-up-to level for ordering strategy, and [Formula: see text], a function of on-hand inventory level, characterizes the pricing strategy. In this paper, we consider incomplete demand information and develop online learning algorithms whose average profit approaches that of the optimal [Formula: see text] with a tight [Formula: see text] regret rate. A number of salient features differentiate our work from the existing online learning researches in the operations management (OM) literature. First, computing the optimal [Formula: see text] policy requires solving a dynamic programming (DP) over multiple periods involving unknown quantities, which is different from the majority of learning problems in OM that only require solving single-period optimization questions. It is hence challenging to establish stability results through DP recursions, which we accomplish by proving uniform convergence of the profit-to-go function. The necessity of analyzing action-dependent state transition over multiple periods resembles the reinforcement learning question, considerably more difficult than existing bandit learning algorithms. Second, the pricing function [Formula: see text] is of infinite dimension, and approaching it is much more challenging than approaching a finite number of parameters as seen in existing researches. The demand-price relationship is estimated based on upper confidence bound, but the confidence interval cannot be explicitly calculated due to the complexity of the DP recursion. Finally, because of the multiperiod nature of [Formula: see text] policies the actual distribution of the randomness in demand plays an important role in determining the optimal pricing strategy [Formula: see text], which is unknown to the learner a priori. In this paper, the demand randomness is approximated by an empirical distribution constructed using dependent samples, and a novel Wasserstein metric-based argument is employed to prove convergence of the empirical distribution. This paper was accepted by J. George Shanthikumar, big data analytics.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2006526
- PAR ID:
- 10342728
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Management Science
- ISSN:
- 0025-1909
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4171
