The recent spate of cyber attacks towards Internet of Things (IoT) devices in smart homes calls for effective techniques to understand, characterize, and unveil IoT device activities. In this paper, we present a new system, named IoTAthena, to unveil IoT device activities from raw network traffic consisting of timestamped IP packets. IoTAthena characterizes each IoT device activity using an activity signature consisting of an ordered sequence of IP packets with inter-packet time intervals. IoTAthena has two novel polynomial time algorithms, sigMatch and actExtract. For any given signature, sigMatch can capture all matches of the signature in the raw network traffic. Using sigMatch as a subfunction, actExtract can accurately unveil the sequence of various IoT device activities from the raw network traffic. Using the network traffic of heterogeneous IoT devices collected at the router of a real-world smart home testbed and a public IoT dataset, we demonstrate that IoTAthena is able to characterize and generate activity signatures of IoT device activities and accurately unveil the sequence of IoT device activities from raw network traffic.
IoTMosaic: Inferring User Activities from IoT Network Traffic in Smart Homes
Recent advances in cyber-physical systems, artificial intelligence, and cloud computing have driven the wide deployments of Internet-of-things (IoT) in smart homes. As IoT devices often directly interact with the users and environments, this paper studies if and how we could explore the collective insights from multiple heterogeneous IoT devices to infer user activities for home safety monitoring and assisted living. Specifically, we develop a new system, namely IoTMosaic, to first profile diverse user activities with distinct IoT device event sequences, which are extracted from smart home network traffic based on their TCP/IP data packet signatures. Given the challenges of missing and out-of-order IoT device events due to device malfunctions or varying network and system latencies, IoTMosaic further develops simple yet effective approximate matching algorithms to identify user activities from real-world IoT network traffic. Our experimental results on thousands of user activities in the smart home environment over two months show that our proposed algorithms can infer different user activities from IoT network traffic in smart homes with the overall accuracy, precision, and recall of 0.99, 0.99, and 1.00, respectively.
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE INFOCOM2022
- Page Range or eLocation-ID:
- 370 to 379
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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