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The classic house allocation problem is primarily concerned with finding a matching between a set of agents and a set of houses that guarantees some notion of economic efficiency (e.g. utilitarian welfare). While recent works have shifted focus on achieving fairness (e.g. minimizing the number of envious agents), they often come with notable costs on efficiency notions such as utilitarian or egalitarian welfare. We investigate the trade-offs between these welfare measures and several natural fairness measures that rely on the number of envious agents, the total (aggregate) envy of all agents, and maximum total envy of an agent. In particular, by focusing on envy-free allocations, we first show that, should one exist, finding an envy-free allocation with maximum utilitarian or egalitarian welfare is computationally tractable. We highlight a rather stark contrast between utilitarian and egalitarian welfare by showing that finding utilitarian welfare maximizing allocations that minimize the aforementioned fairness measures can be done in polynomial time while their egalitarian counterparts remain intractable (for the most part) even under binary valuations. We complement our theoretical findings by giving insights into the relationship between the different fairness measures and by conducting empirical analysis.
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Learning to Design Fair and Private Voting Rules
Voting is used widely to identify a collective decision for a group of agents, based on their preferences. In this paper, we focus on evaluating and designing voting rules that support both the privacy of the voting agents and a notion of fairness over such agents. To do this, we introduce a novel notion of group fairness and adopt the existing notion of local differential privacy. We then evaluate the level of group fairness in several existing voting rules, as well as the trade-offs between fairness and privacy, showing that it is not possible to always obtain maximal economic efficiency with high fairness or high privacy levels. Then, we present both a machine learning and a constrained optimization approach to design new voting rules that are fair while maintaining a high level of economic efficiency. Finally, we empirically examine the effect of adding noise to create local differentially private voting rules and discuss the three-way trade-off between economic efficiency, fairness, and privacy.This paper appears in the special track on AI & Society.
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- PAR ID:
- 10388995
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Volume:
- 75
- ISSN:
- 1076-9757
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1139 to 1176
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.13734
