We consider a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) scenario, where a signal is transmitted through a state-dependent wiretap channel with one legitimate receiver with which the transmitter communicates and one honest-but-curious target that the transmitter wants to sense. The secure ISAC channel is modeled as two state-dependent fast-fading channels with correlated Rayleigh fading coefficients and independent additive Gaussian noise components. Delayed channel outputs are fed back to the transmitter to improve the communication performance and to estimate the channel state sequence. We establish and illustrate an achievable secrecy-distortion region for degraded secure ISAC channels under correlated Rayleigh fading, for which we show that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise is not a sufficient statistic. We also evaluate the inner bound for a large set of parameters to derive practical design insights. The presented results include parameter ranges for which the secrecy capacity of a classical wiretap channel setup is surpassed and for which the channel capacity is approached. Thus, we illustrate for correlated Rayleigh fading cases that our secure ISAC methods can (i) eliminate the need for the legitimate receiver to have a statistical advantage over the eavesdropper and (ii) provide communication security with minimal rate penalty.
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Gaussian Multiuser Wiretap Channels in the Presence of a Jammer-Aided Eavesdropper
This paper considers secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper and a malicious jammer. The jammer is assumed to be oblivious of the communication signals emitted by the legitimate transmitter(s) but can employ any jamming strategy subject to a given power constraint and shares her jamming signal with the eavesdropper. Four such models are considered: (i) the Gaussian point-to-point wiretap channel; (ii) the Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel; (iii) the Gaussian broadcast wiretap channel; and (iv) the Gaussian symmetric interference wiretap channel. The use of pre-shared randomness between the legitimate users is not allowed in our models. Inner and outer bounds are derived for these four models. For (i), the secrecy capacity is obtained. For (ii) and (iv) under a degraded setup, the optimal secrecy sum-rate is characterized. Finally, for (iii), ranges of model parameter values for which the inner and outer bounds coincide are identified.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2047913
- PAR ID:
- 10397560
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Entropy
- Volume:
- 24
- Issue:
- 11
- ISSN:
- 1099-4300
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1595
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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