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Title: Wiggle: Physical Challenge-Response Verification of Vehicle Platooning
In this work, we establish a physical access control mechanism for vehicular platoons. The goal is to restrict vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications to platooning members by tying the digital identity of a candidate vehicle requesting to join a platoon to its physical trajectory relative to the platoon. We propose the Wiggle protocol that employs a physical challenge-response exchange to prove that a candidate requesting to be admitted into a platoon actually follows it. The protocol name is inspired by the random longitudinal movements that the candidate is challenged to execute. Wiggle prevents any remote adversary from joining the platoon and injecting fake V2V messages. Compared to prior works, Wiggle is resistant to prerecording attacks and can verify that the candidate is traveling behind the verifier in the same lane.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1852199
PAR ID:
10433129
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
2023 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)
Page Range / eLocation ID:
54 to 60
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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