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Emerging technologies drive the ongoing transformation of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). This transformation has given rise to cybersecurity concerns, among which data poisoning attack emerges as a new threat as ITS increasingly relies on data. In data poisoning attacks, attackers inject malicious perturbations into datasets, potentially leading to inaccurate results in offline learning and real-time decision-making processes. This paper concentrates on data poisoning attack models against ITS. We identify the main ITS data sources vulnerable to poisoning attacks and application scenarios that enable staging such attacks. A general framework is developed following rigorous study process from cybersecurity but also considering specific ITS application needs. Data poisoning attacks against ITS are reviewed and categorized following the framework. We then discuss the current limitations of these attack models and the future research directions. Our work can serve as a guideline to better understand the threat of data poisoning attacks against ITS applications, while also giving a perspective on the future development of trustworthy ITS. Emerging technologies drive the ongoing transformation of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). This transformation has given rise to cybersecurity concerns, among which data poisoning attack emerges as a new threat as ITS increasingly relies on data. In data poisoning attacks, attackers inject malicious perturbations into datasets, potentially leading to inaccurate results in offline learning and real-time decision-making processes. This paper concentrates on data poisoning attack models against ITS. We identify the main ITS data sources vulnerable to poisoning attacks and application scenarios that enable staging such attacks. A general framework is developed following rigorous study process from cybersecurity but also considering specific ITS application needs. Data poisoning attacks against ITS are reviewed and categorized following the framework. We then discuss the current limitations of these attack models and the future research directions. Our work can serve as a guideline to better understand the threat of data poisoning attacks against ITS applications, while also giving a perspective on the future development of trustworthy ITS.
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Unifying Threats against Information Integrity in Participatory Crowd Sensing
This article proposes a unified threat landscape for Participatory Crowd Sensing (P-CS) systems. Specifically, it focuses on attacks from organized malicious actors that may use the knowledge of P-CS platform's operations and exploit algorithmic weaknesses in AI-based methods of event trust, user reputation, decision-making or recommendation models deployed to preserve information integrity in P-CS. We emphasize on intent driven malicious behaviors by advanced adversaries and how attacks are crafted to achieve those attack impacts. Three directions of the threat model are introduced, such as attack goals, types, and strategies. We expand on how various strategies are linked with different attack types and goals, underscoring formal definition, their relevance and impact on the P-CS platform.
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- PAR ID:
- 10434255
- Editor(s):
- Kawsar, Fahim
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE pervasive computing
- ISSN:
- 1536-1268
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/MPRV.2023.3296271
