We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. As a special case, our model captures the common scenario where voters can be categorized into three types: those who always prefer one alternative, those who always prefer the other, and those contingent voters whose preferences depends on the state. In this setting, even if every voter is a contingent voter, agents voting according to their private information need not result in the adoption of the universally preferred alternative, because the signals can be systematically biased.We present a mechanism that elicits and aggregates the private signals from the voters, and outputs the alternative that is favored by the majority. In particular, voters truthfully reporting their signals forms a strong Bayes Nash equilibrium (where no coalition of voters can deviate and receive a better outcome).
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Learning from Neighbours about a Changing State
Abstract Agents learn about a changing state using private signals and their neighbours’ past estimates of the state. We present a model in which Bayesian agents in equilibrium use neighbours’ estimates simply by taking weighted sums with time-invariant weights. The dynamics thus parallel those of the tractable DeGroot model of learning in networks, but arise as an equilibrium outcome rather than a behavioural assumption. We examine whether information aggregation is nearly optimal as neighbourhoods grow large. A key condition for this is signal diversity: each individual’s neighbours have private signals that not only contain independent information, but also have sufficiently different distributions. Without signal diversity—e.g. if private signals are i.i.d.—learning is suboptimal in all networks and highly inefficient in some. Turning to social influence, we find it is much more sensitive to one’s signal quality than to one’s number of neighbours, in contrast to standard models with exogenous updating rules.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1847860
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10455013
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Review of Economic Studies
- Volume:
- 90
- Issue:
- 5
- ISSN:
- 0034-6527
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 2326 to 2369
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac077
