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This content will become publicly available on May 13, 2025

Title: Fast Attack Recovery for Stochastic Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber-physical systems tightly integrate computational resources with physical processes through sensing and actuating, widely penetrating various safety-critical domains, such as autonomous driving, medical monitoring, and industrial control. Unfortunately, they are susceptible to assorted attacks that can result in injuries or physical damage soon after the system is compromised. Consequently, we require mechanisms that swiftly recover their physical states, redirecting a compromised system to desired states to mitigate hazardous situations that can result from attacks. However, existing recovery studies have overlooked stochastic uncertainties that can be unbounded, making a recovery infeasible or invalidating safety and real-time guarantees. This paper presents a novel recovery approach that achieves the highest probability of steering the physical states of systems with stochastic uncertainties to a target set rapidly or within a given time. Further, we prove that our method is sound, complete, fast, and has low computational complexity if the target set can be expressed as a strip. Finally, we demonstrate the practicality of our solution through the implementation in multiple use cases encompassing both linear and nonlinear dynamics, including robotic vehicles, drones, and vehicles in high-fidelity simulators.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2333980
PAR ID:
10499413
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
IEEE
Date Published:
Journal Name:
IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
Hong Kong, China
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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