The
- PAR ID:
- 10513709
- Publisher / Repository:
- SMAI
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations
- Volume:
- 30
- ISSN:
- 1292-8119
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 35
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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