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1. Smooth Nash Equilibria: Algorithms and Complexity

   https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.37  

   Daskalakis, Constantinos; Golowich, Noah; Haghtalab, Nika; Shetty, Abhishek (January 2024, Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs):15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024))

   Guruswami, Venkatesan (Ed.)

   A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a relaxed variant of Nash equilibrium called σ-smooth Nash equilibrium, for a {smoothness parameter} σ. In a σ-smooth Nash equilibrium, players only need to achieve utility at least as high as their best deviation to a σ-smooth strategy, which is a distribution that does not put too much mass (as parametrized by σ) on any fixed action. We distinguish two variants of σ-smooth Nash equilibria: strong σ-smooth Nash equilibria, in which players are required to play σ-smooth strategies under equilibrium play, and weak σ-smooth Nash equilibria, where there is no such requirement. We show that both weak and strong σ-smooth Nash equilibria have superior computational properties to Nash equilibria: when σ as well as an approximation parameter ϵ and the number of players are all constants, there is a {constant-time} randomized algorithm to find a weak ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibrium in normal-form games. In the same parameter regime, there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm to find a strong ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game. These results stand in contrast to the optimal algorithm for computing ϵ-approximate Nash equilibria, which cannot run in faster than quasipolynomial-time, subject to complexity-theoretic assumptions. We complement our upper bounds by showing that when either σ or ϵ is an inverse polynomial, finding a weak ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibria becomes computationally intractable. Our results are the first to propose a variant of Nash equilibrium which is computationally tractable, allows players to act independently, and which, as we discuss, is justified by an extensive line of work on individual choice behavior in the economics literature. 

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2. Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games

   https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1981  

   Adsul, Bharat; Garg, Jugal; Mehta, Ruta; Sohoni, Milind; von Stengel, Bernhard (March 2021, Operations Research)

   The rank of a bimatrix game is the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices. This paper comprehensively analyzes games of rank one and shows the following: (1) For a game of rank r, the set of its Nash equilibria is the intersection of a generically one-dimensional set of equilibria of parameterized games of rank r − 1 with a hyperplane. (2) One equilibrium of a rank-1 game can be found in polynomial time. (3) All equilibria of a rank-1 game can be found by following a piecewise linear path. In contrast, such a path-following method finds only one equilibrium of a bimatrix game. (4) The number of equilibria of a rank-1 game may be exponential. (5) There is a homeomorphism between the space of bimatrix games and their equilibrium correspondence that preserves rank. It is a variation of the homeomorphism used for the concept of strategic stability of an equilibrium component. 

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3. On the existence of Nash Equilibrium in games with resource-bounded players

   Halpern, Joseph Y; Pass, Rafael; Reichman, Daniel (September 2019, Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on A Game Theory (SAGT)})

   We consider computational games, sequences of games G = (G1,G2,...) where, for all n, Gn has the same set of players. Computational games arise in electronic money systems such as Bitcoin, in cryptographic protocols, and in the study of generative adversarial networks in machine learning. Assuming that one-way functions exist, we prove that there is 2-player zero-sum computational game G such that, for all n, the size of the action space in Gn is polynomial in n and the utility function in Gn is computable in time polynomial in n, and yet there is no ε-Nash equilibrium if players are restricted to using strategies computable by polynomial-time Turing machines, where we use a notion of Nash equilibrium that is tailored to computational games. We also show that an ε-Nash equilibrium may not exist if players are constrained to perform at most T computational steps in each of the games in the sequence. On the other hand, we show that if players can use arbitrary Turing machines to compute their strategies, then every computational game has an ε-Nash equilibrium. These results may shed light on competitive settings where the availability of more running time or faster algorithms can lead to a “computational arms race”, precluding the existence of equilibrium. They also point to inherent limitations of concepts such as “best response” and Nash equilibrium in games with resource-bounded players. 

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4. Multiplayer Performative Prediction: Learning in Decision-Dependent Games

   Narang, Adhyyan; Faulkner, Evan; Drusvyatskiy, Dmitriy; Fazel, Maryam; Ratliff, Lillian J. (January 2023, Journal of Machine Learning Research)

   Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers’ actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called multi-player performative prediction. We focus on two distinct solution concepts, namely (i) performatively stable equilibria and (ii) Nash equilibria of the game. The latter equilibria are arguably more informative, but are generally computationally difficult to find since they are solutions of nonmonotone games. We show that under mild assumptions, the performatively stable equilibria can be found efficiently by a variety of algorithms, including repeated retraining and the repeated (stochastic) gradient method. We then establish transparent sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity of the game and use them to develop algorithms for finding Nash equilibria. We investigate derivative free methods and adaptive gradient algorithms wherein each player alternates between learning a parametric description of their distribution and gradient steps on the empirical risk. Synthetic and semi-synthetic numerical experiments illustrate the results. 

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5. Satiation in Fisher Markets and Approximation of Nash Social Welfare

   https://doi.org/10.1287/MOOR.2019.0129  

   Garg, Jugal; Hoefer, Martin; Mehlhorn, Kurt (May 2024, Mathematics of Operations Research)

   We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits, and buyers have utility limits. Beyond applications in economics, they arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents. In contrast to markets with either earning or utility limits, markets with both limits have not been studied before. They turn out to have fundamentally different properties. In general, the existence of competitive equilibria is not guaranteed. We identify a natural property of markets (termed money clearing) that implies existence. We show that the set of equilibria is not always convex, answering a question posed in the literature. We design an FPTAS to compute an approximate equilibrium and prove that the problem of computing an exact equilibrium lies in the complexity class continuous local search ([Formula: see text]; i.e., the intersection of polynomial local search ([Formula: see text]) and polynomial parity arguments on directed graphs ([Formula: see text])). For a constant number of buyers or goods, we give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an exact equilibrium. We show how (approximate) equilibria can be rounded and provide the first constant-factor approximation algorithm (with a factor of 2.404) for maximizing Nash social welfare when agents have capped linear (also known as budget-additive) valuations. Finally, we significantly improve the approximation hardness for additive valuations to [Formula: see text]. Funding: J. Garg was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant CCF-1942321 (CAREER)]. M. Hoefer was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grants Ho 3831/5-1, Ho 3831/6-1, and Ho 3831/7-1]. 

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