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  1. In this paper, we generalize the recently studied stochastic matching problem to more accurately model a significant medical process, kidney exchange, and several other applications. Up until now the stochastic matching problem that has been studied was as follows: given a graph G= (V,E), each edge is included in the realized sub-graph of G independently with probability pe, and the goal is to find a degree-bounded sub-graph Q of G that has an expected maximum matching that approximates the expected maximum matching of G. This model does not account for possibilities of vertex dropouts, which can be found in several applications, e.g. in kidney exchange when donors or patients opt out of the exchange process as well as in online freelancing and online dating when online profiles are found to be faked. Thus, we will study a more generalized model of stochastic matching in which vertices and edges are both realized independently with some probabilities pv, pe, respectively, which more accurately fits important applications than the previously studied model. We will discuss the first algorithms and analysis for this generalization of the stochastic matching model and prove that they achieve good approximation ratios. In particular, we show that the approximation factor of a natural algorithm for this problem is at least 0.6568 in unweighted graphs, and 1/2+ε in weighted graphs for some constant ε >0. We further improve our result for unweighted graphs to 2/3 using edge degree constrained sub-graphs (EDCS). 
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  2. null (Ed.)
    The edit distance between two strings is defined as the smallest number of insertions , deletions , and substitutions that need to be made to transform one of the strings to another one. Approximating edit distance in subquadratic time is “one of the biggest unsolved problems in the field of combinatorial pattern matching” [37]. Our main result is a quantum constant approximation algorithm for computing the edit distance in truly subquadratic time. More precisely, we give an quantum algorithm that approximates the edit distance within a factor of 3. We further extend this result to an quantum algorithm that approximates the edit distance within a larger constant factor. Our solutions are based on a framework for approximating edit distance in parallel settings. This framework requires as black box an algorithm that computes the distances of several smaller strings all at once. For a quantum algorithm, we reduce the black box to metric estimation and provide efficient algorithms for approximating it. We further show that this framework enables us to approximate edit distance in distributed settings. To this end, we provide a MapReduce algorithm to approximate edit distance within a factor of , with sublinearly many machines and sublinear memory. Also, our algorithm runs in a logarithmic number of rounds. 
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  3. We provide a polynomial-time, scalable algorithm for equilibrium computation in multi-agent influence games on networks, extending work of Bindel, Kleinberg, and Oren (2015) from the single-agent to the multi-agent setting. In games of influence, agents have limited advertising budget to influence the initial predisposition of nodes in some network towards their products, but the eventual decisions of the nodes are determined by the stationary state of DeGroot opinion dynamics on the network, which takes over after the seeding (Ahmadinejad et al. 2014, 2015). In multi-agent systems, how should agents spend their budgets to seed the network to maximize their utility in anticipation of other advertising agents and the network dynamics? We show that Nash equilibria of this game are pure and (under weak assumptions) unique, and can be computed in polynomial time; we test our model by computing equilibria using mirror descent for the two-agent case on random graphs. 
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