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Title: Negative value of information in systems’ maintenance
The value of information (VoI) provides a rational metric to assess the impact of data in decision processes, including maintenance of engineering systems. According to the principle that “information never hurts”, VoI is guaranteed to be non-negative when a single agent aims at minimizing an expected cost. However, in other contexts such as non-cooperative games, where agents compete against each other, revealing a piece of information to all agents may have a negative impact to some of them, as the negative effect of the competitors being informed and adjusting their policies surpasses the direct VoI. Being aware of this, some agents prefer to avoid having certain information collected, when it must be shared with others, as the overall VoI is negative for them. A similar result may occur for managers of infrastructure assets following the prescriptions of codes and regulations. Modern codes require the probability of some failure events be below a threshold, so managers are forced to retrofit assets if that probability is too high. If the economic incentive of those agents disagrees with the code requirements, the VoI associated with tests or inspections may be negative. In this paper, we investigate under what circumstance this happens, and how severe the effects of this issue can be.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1638327
NSF-PAR ID:
10065509
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Safety, Reliability, Risk, Resilience and Sustainability of Structures and Infrastructure 12th Int. Conf. on Structural Safety and Reliability, Vienna, Austria, 6–10 August 2017
Page Range / eLocation ID:
3339-3346
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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