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Title: Counterfeit IC Countermeasure with 4T Cell Based Authentication Circuit
A simple and compact authentication circuit based on a 4T bit cell is proposed for counterfeit detection and avoidance. The PUF-based authentication circuit has been designed to reduce or eliminate the reluctance of COTs manufacturers to include onchip fingerprints by not requiring additional die area, I/O pins, or read-out circuits and by using a deep-sleep mode during normal circuit operation so that it does not interfere with operation of the main IC.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1814516
PAR ID:
10135571
Author(s) / Creator(s):
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Government Microelectronic Applications and Technology Conference
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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