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Title: On Locally Decodable Codes in Resource Bounded Channels
Constructions of locally decodable codes (LDCs) have one of two undesirable properties: low rate or high locality (polynomial in the length of the message). In settings where the encoder/decoder have already exchanged cryptographic keys and the channel is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm, it is possible to circumvent these barriers and design LDCs with constant rate and small locality. However, the assumption that the encoder/decoder have exchanged cryptographic keys is often prohibitive. We thus consider the problem of designing explicit and efficient LDCs in settings where the channel is slightly more constrained than the encoder/decoder with respect to some resource e.g., space or (sequential) time. Given an explicit function f that the channel cannot compute, we show how the encoder can transmit a random secret key to the local decoder using f(⋅) and a random oracle 𝖧(⋅). We then bootstrap the private key LDC construction of Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai (ICALP, 2007), thereby answering an open question posed by Guruswami and Smith (FOCS 2010) of whether such bootstrapping techniques are applicable to LDCs in channel models weaker than just PPT algorithms. Specifically, in the random oracle model we show how to construct explicit constant rate LDCs with locality of more » polylog in the security parameter against various resource constrained channels. « less
Authors:
; ;
Editors:
Yael Tauman Kalai and Adam D. Smith and Daniel Wichs
Award ID(s):
1910659 1910411
Publication Date:
NSF-PAR ID:
10200738
Journal Name:
Leibniz international proceedings in informatics
Volume:
163
Page Range or eLocation-ID:
16:1--16:23
ISSN:
1868-8969
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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