skip to main content

Attention:

The NSF Public Access Repository (NSF-PAR) system and access will be unavailable from 11:00 PM ET on Thursday, October 10 until 2:00 AM ET on Friday, October 11 due to maintenance. We apologize for the inconvenience.


Title: Incentive-Compatible Kidney Exchange in a Slightly Semi-Random Model
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study the following mechanism-design problem: On a directed graph (of transplant compatibilities among patient--donor pairs), the mechanism must select a simple path (a chain of transplantations) starting at a distinguished vertex (an altruistic donor) such that the total length of this path is as large as possible (a maximum number of patients receive a kidney). However, the mechanism does not have direct access to the graph. Instead, the vertices are partitioned over multiple players (hospitals), and each player reports a subset of her vertices to the mechanism. In particular, a player may strategically omit vertices to increase how many of her vertices lie on the path returned by the mechanism. Our objective is to find mechanisms that limit incentives for such manipulation while producing long paths. Unfortunately, in worst-case instances, competing with the overall longest path is impossible while incentivizing (approximate) truthfulness, i.e., requiring that hiding nodes cannot increase a player's utility by more than a factor of 1 + o(1). We therefore adopt a semi-random model where o(n) random edges are added to worst-case instances. While it remains impossible for truthful mechanisms to compete with the overall longest path, we give a truthful mechanism that competes with a weaker but non-trivial benchmark: the length of any path whose subpaths within each player have a minimum average length. In fact, our mechanism satisfies even a stronger notion of truthfulness, which we call matching-time incentive compatibility. This notion of truthfulness requires that each player not only reports her nodes truthfully but also does not stop the returned path at any of her nodes in order to divert it to a continuation inside her own subgraph.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1733556
NSF-PAR ID:
10288576
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Volume:
21
Page Range / eLocation ID:
138 to 156
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player — who is associated with a subset of vertices — matches as many of his own vertices when he opts into the matching mechanism as when he opts out. We offer a new perspective on this problem by considering an arbitrary graph, but assuming that vertices are associated with players at random. Our main result asserts that, under certain conditions, any fixed optimal matching is likely to be individually rational up to lower-order terms. We also show that a simple and practical mechanism is (fully) individually rational, and likely to be optimal up to lower-order terms. We discuss the implications of our results for market design in general, and kidney exchange in particular. 
    more » « less
  2. We consider the problem of distributed corruption detection in networks. In this model each node of a directed graph is either truthful or corrupt. Each node reports the type (truthful or corrupt) of each of its outneighbors. If it is truthful, it reports the truth, whereas if it is corrupt, it reports adversarially. This model, first considered by Preparata, Metze and Chien in 1967, motivated by the desire to identify the faulty components of a digital system by having the other components checking them, became known as the PMC model. The main known results for this model characterize networks in which all corrupt (that is, faulty) nodes can be identified, when there is a known upper bound on their number. We are interested in networks in which a large fraction of the nodes can be classified. It is known that in the PMC model, in order to identify all corrupt nodes when their number is t, all in-degrees have to be at least t. In contrast, we show that in d regular-graphs with strong expansion properties, a 1 - O(1/d) fraction of the corrupt nodes, and a 1 - O(1/d) fraction of the truthful nodes can be identified, whenever there is a majority of truthful nodes. We also observe that if the graph is very far from being a good expander, namely, if the deletion of a small set of nodes splits the graph into small components, then no corruption detection is possible even if most of the nodes are truthful. Finally we discuss the algorithmic aspects and the computational hardness of the problem. 
    more » « less
  3. Peer prediction aims to incentivize truthful reports from agents whose reports cannot be assessed with any objective ground truthful information. In the multi-task setting where each agent is asked multiple questions, a sequence of mechanisms have been proposed which are truthful — truth-telling is guaranteed to be an equilibrium, or even better, informed truthful — truth-telling is guaranteed to be one of the best-paid equilibria. However, these guarantees assume agents’ strategies are restricted to be task-independent: an agent’s report on a task is not affected by her information about other tasks. We provide the first discussion on how to design (informed) truthful mechanisms for task-dependent strategies, which allows the agents to report based on all her information on the assigned tasks. We call such stronger mechanisms (informed) omni-truthful. In particular, we propose the joint-disjoint task framework, a new paradigm which builds upon the previous penalty-bonus task framework. First, we show a natural reduction from mechanisms in the penalty-bonus task framework to mechanisms in the joint-disjoint task framework that maps every truthful mechanism to an omni-truthful mechanism. Such a reduction is non-trivial as we show that current penalty-bonus task mechanisms are not, in general, omni-truthful. Second, for a stronger truthful guarantee, we design the matching agreement (MA) mechanism which is informed omni-truthful. Finally, for the MA mechanism in the detail-free setting where no prior knowledge is assumed, we show how many tasks are required to (approximately) retain the truthful guarantees. 
    more » « less
  4. null (Ed.)
    Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize agents to truthfully report their signals even in the absence of verification by comparing agents’ reports with those of their peers. In the detail-free multi-task setting, agents are asked to respond to multiple independent and identically distributed tasks, and the mechanism does not know the prior distribution of agents’ signals. The goal is to provide an epsilon-strongly truthful mechanism where truth-telling rewards agents “strictly” more than any other strategy profile (with epsilon additive error) even for heterogeneous agents, and to do so while requiring as few tasks as possible. We design a family of mechanisms with a scoring function that maps a pair of reports to a score. The mechanism is strongly truthful if the scoring function is “prior ideal”. Moreover, the mechanism is epsilon-strongly truthful as long as the scoring function used is sufficiently close to the ideal scoring function. This reduces the above mechanism design problem to a learning problem – specifically learning an ideal scoring function. Because learning the prior distribution is sufficient (but not necessary) to learn the scoring function, we can apply standard learning theory techniques that leverage side information about the prior (e.g., that it is close to some parametric model). Furthermore, we derive a variational representation of an ideal scoring function and reduce the learning problem into an empirical risk minimization. We leverage this reduction to obtain very general results for peer prediction in the multi-task setting. Specifically, Sample Complexity. We show how to derive good bounds on the number of tasks required for different types of priors–in some cases exponentially improving previous results. In particular, we can upper bound the required number of tasks for parametric models with bounded learning complexity. Furthermore, our reduction applies to myriad continuous signal space settings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first peer-prediction mechanism on continuous signals designed for the multi-task setting. Connection to Machine Learning. We show how to turn a soft-predictor of an agent’s signals (given the other agents’ signals) into a mechanism. This allows the practical use of machine learning algorithms that give good results even when many agents provide noisy information. Stronger Properties. In the finite setting, we obtain -strongly truthful mechanisms for any stochastically relevant prior. Prior works either only apply to more restrictive settings, or achieve a weaker notion of truthfulness (informed truthfulness). 
    more » « less
  5. Let f be a drawing in the Euclidean plane of a graph G, which is understood to be a 1-dimensional simplicial complex. We assume that every edge of G is drawn by f as a curve of constant algebraic complexity, and the ratio of the length of the longest simple path to the the length of the shortest edge is poly(n). In the drawing f, a path P of G, or its image in the drawing π = f(P), is β-stretch if π is a simple (non-self-intersecting) curve, and for every pair of distinct points p ∈ P and q ∈ P , the length of the sub-curve of π connecting f(p) with f(q) is at most β∥f(p) − f(q)∥, where ∥.∥ denotes the Euclidean distance. We introduce and study the β-stretch Path Problem (βSP for short), in which we are given a pair of vertices s and t of G, and we are to decide whether in the given drawing of G there exists a β-stretch path P connecting s and t. We also output P if it exists. The βSP quantifies a notion of “near straightness” for paths in a graph G, motivated by gerrymandering regions in a map, where edges of G represent natural geographical/political boundaries that may be chosen to bound election districts. The notion of a β-stretch path naturally extends to cycles, and the extension gives a measure of how gerrymandered a district is. Furthermore, we show that the extension is closely related to several studied measures of local fatness of geometric shapes. We prove that βSP is strongly NP-complete. We complement this result by giving a quasi-polynomial time algorithm, that for a given ε > 0, β ∈ O(poly(log |V (G)|)), and s, t ∈ V (G), outputs a β-stretch path between s and t, if a (1 − ε)β-stretch path between s and t exists in the drawing. 
    more » « less