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Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading is a decentralized energy market where local energy prosumers act as peers, trading energy among each other. Existing works in this area largely overlook the importance of user behavioral modeling, assume users’ sustained active participation, and full compliance in the decision-making process. To overcome these unrealistic assumptions, and their deleterious consequences, in this paper we propose an automated P2P energy trading framework that specifically considers the users’ perception by exploiting prospect theory . We formalize an optimization problem that maximizes the buyers’ perceived utility while matching energy production and demand. We prove that the problem is NP-hard and we propose a Differential Evolution-based Algorithm for Trading Energy ( DEbATE ) heuristic. Additionally, we propose two automated pricing solutions to improve the sellers’ profit based on reinforcement learning. The first solution, named Pricing mechanism with Q-learning and Risk-sensitivity ( PQR ), is based on Q-learning. Additionally, the given scalability issues of PQR , we propose a Deep Q-Network-based algorithm called ProDQN that exploits deep learning and a novel loss function rooted in prospect theory. Results based on real traces of energy consumption and production, as well as realistic prospect theory functions, show that our approaches achieve \(26\% \) higher perceived value for buyers and generate \(7\% \) more reward for sellers, compared to recent state-of-the-art approaches.
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Prosumer-Centric Self-Sustained Smart Grid Systems
Modern smart grid systems exploit a two-way interaction paradigm between the utility and the electricity user and promote the role of prosumer, as a new user type, able to generate and sell energy, or consume energy. Within such a setting, the prosumers and their interactions with the microgrid system become of high significance for its efficient operation. In this article, to model the corresponding interactions, we introduce a labor economics-based framework by exploiting the principles of contract theory, that jointly achieves the satisfaction of the various interacting system entities, i.e., the microgrid operator (MGO) and the prosumers. The MGO offers personalized rewards to the sellers and buyers, to incentivize them to sell and purchase energy, respectively. To provide a stable and efficient operation point, while aiming at jointly satisfying the profit and requirements of the involved competing parties, optimal personalized contracts, i.e., rewards and amount of sold/purchased energy, are determined, by formulating and solving contract-theoretic optimization problems between the MGO and the sellers or buyers. The analysis is provided for both cases of complete and incomplete information availability regarding the prosumers’ types. Detailed numerical results are presented to demonstrate the operation characteristics of the proposed framework under diverse scenarios.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1757207
- PAR ID:
- 10321107
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE Systems Journal
- ISSN:
- 1932-8184
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/JSYST.2022.3156877
